











































A common assumption in the optimal taxation literature is that the social planner maximizes a
welfarist social welfare function with weights decreasing with income. However, high transfer
withdrawal rates in many countries imply very low weights for the working poor in practice. We
reconcile this puzzle by generalizing the optimal taxation framework by Saez (2002) to allow
for alternatives to welfarism. We calculate weights of a social planner’s function as implied by
the German tax and transfer system based on the concepts of welfarism, minimum absolute and
relative sacrifice, as well as subjective justness. For the latter we use a novel question from the
German Socio-Economic Panel. We find that the minimum absolute sacrifice principle is in line
with social weights that decline with net income. Absolute subjective justness is roughly in line
with decreasing social weights, which is reflected by preferences of men, West Germans, and
supporters of the grand coalition parties.
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1 Introduction
Optimal taxation is only relevant if it is able to capture the actual aims of the social planner.
Therefore, we extend a standard optimal taxation model to reconcile it with observed tax transfer
practices. The standard approach in the welfarist optimal taxation literature is to assume that social
weights decrease with income (e.g., Saez 2001, 2002; Blundell et al. 2009) because this pattern
lies within the bounds confined by the two extreme cases of Rawlsian and Benthamite objective
functions. Intuitively, the hypothesis of decreasing welfarist weights expresses the idea that the
social planner values an increase of net income of the poor by one Euro more than an increase of
net income of higher income groups by one Euro. Saez and Stantcheva (2016) describe welfarism
with decreasing weights as one of their two polar cases of interest. In contrast, tax transfer systems
in many countries can only be optimal if the social planner had chosen weights in a non-decreasing
way.1 As we show, a major reason for this lies in high transfer withdrawal rates for the working
poor.2
In this paper, we generalize the optimal taxation framework by Saez (2002) to divert from wel-
farism. In an exercise of positive optimal taxation, we calculate the social weights under different
concepts of justness. First, we apply the standard welfarist concept. Second, we apply the concept
of minimum sacrifice and, third, a concept based on subjectively just net incomes. This third con-
cept utilizes a novel question in the German Socio-Economic Panel: respondents state what net
income they would consider just.3 We term the latter concept subjective justness. We find that the
minimum absolute sacrifice principle is in line with decreasing social weights.
Our paper is related to studies analyzing optimal taxation when the preferences of the social
planner and individuals differ (Blomquist and Micheletto 2006; Kanbur et al. 2006). Gerritsen
(2016) derives the optimal tax schedule for a government that optimizes a weighted sum of sub-
jective well-being, while individuals maximize utility instead of well-being. He expresses the
tax-schedule in terms of sufficient statistics in a continuous framework. In contrast, we use the dis-
crete sufficient statistics framework that allows for labor supply adjustments at the intensive and
at the extensive margin following Saez (2002). Our paper is further related to studies, where the
1Appendix A reviews a number of studies with this finding.
2Lockwood (2016) shows that under present bias and with job search, optimal marginal tax rates are even lower
than conventionally calculated. This might be especially relevant for marginal tax rates for the working poor.
3We use respondents who consider their current gross income as just. Thus, just net incomes can be interpreted
conditional on given gross incomes.
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social planner maximizes an objective function that is related to ideas of fairness that differ from
welfarism. An example is Ooghe and Peichl (2015), where the social planner aims at compensating
individuals for differences in abilities but not for differences in taste.
The first main contribution of our paper is a generalization of the Saez (2002) model to non-
welfarist aims of the social planner. To our knowledge, we are the first to derive the general
optimal taxation schedule in this framework. In a recent study, Saez and Stantcheva (2016) propose
generalized marginal welfare weights that may depend on characteristics that do not enter utility.4
In contrast, in our approach, the social planner maximizes an objective function that allows for
non-welfarist concepts of justice. The approach in our paper offers the advantage that we can
directly quantify the value the social planner puts on a marginal improvement in a specific justness
criterion for a given group compared to other groups. Thus, we can show which criterion is in line
with social weights that decrease with income.
The second main contribution is the operationalization of two specific ideas of justice: mini-
mum sacrifice and subjective justness. Minimum sacrifice is related to the equal sacrifice principle
(see Mill 1871; Musgrave and Musgrave 1973; Richter 1983; Young 1988), which stipulates that
all individuals should suffer the same ‘sacrifice’ through taxes. The sacrifice is usually defined as
the burden of taxes in terms of utility. Evidence that the equal sacrifice concept is likely to cap-
ture the preferences of a majority is only documented for the U.S: Weinzierl (2014) shows in a
survey that around 60 percent preferred the equal sacrifice tax schedule to a welfarist optimal tax
schedule. While equal sacrifice equalizes the sacrifice due to taxes across a population, minimum
sacrifice minimizes the (weigthed) sum of these utility losses. The concept of minimum sacrifice
is very close to the libertarian concept studied in Saez and Stantcheva (2016).5
The second approach, subjective just income, is novel as we use new questions from the Ger-
man Socio-Economic Panel to measure the perceived justness of gross and net incomes. These
survey questions are representative for the working population in Germany. To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first to use such a rich assessment of subjective preferences for just taxation
in an optimal taxation framework. We analyze the social weights implied by subjective justness
for subgroups of the population that might adhere to different concepts of justness: females and
males, East Germans and West Germans who lived under different political systems for more than
4Similar to Saez and Stantcheva (2016), we take society’s preferences as given and do not analyze how they could
arise through the political process.
5Saez and Stantcheva (2016) allow for welfarist weights to increase with the amount of taxes paid. Thus decreasing
taxes for those with a high tax burden is a high priority for the social planner.
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a generation, as well as supporters of different political parties. The third main contribution is the
application to the German tax and transfer system, as of 2015, for which we estimate the labor
supply elasticities using microsimulation and a structural labor supply model.
Our main result is that the concept of minimum sacrifice is in line with positive, declining
social weights. The explanation for this finding is that the marginal sacrifice increases with the
amount of taxes paid and the working poor pay only a low amount of taxes. Although the costs of
redistributing a Euro to this group are relatively small, the reduction in sacrifice is small too. In
contrast, the increase in utility is high in the welfarist case. A second finding is a confirmation of
previous studies: the welfarist approach implies very low weights for the working poor under the
2015 German tax and transfer system. Finally, we find that the German tax and transfer system is
roughly in line with the minimization of absolute deviations from subjective just net incomes and
decreasing social weights. This suggests that most people have a subjective concept of justness in
mind that is equal or similar to minimum sacrifice.
The next section introduces our optimal taxation model for different concepts of justness, Sec-
tion 3 describes how we calculate actual and just incomes as well as how we estimate extensive
and intensive labor supply elasticities for Germany. In Section 4, we describe the resulting weights
for different concepts of justness, while Section 5 concludes.
2 A Model of Optimal Taxation for Concepts of Justness
2.1 The General Framework
We generalize the canonical model by Saez (2002), which combines the pioneering work by Mir-
rlees (1971) and Diamond (1980), beyond utilitarian social welfare functions. See Appendix B for
a formal derivation. The key difference between Saez (2002) model and our generalization is that
in Saez (2002) the social planner maximizes the weighted sum of utility. The main advantage of
our approach is that we allow for the social planner to maximize the weighted sum of ‘justness
functions’ fi. These functions can depend on various variables and incorporate different concepts
of justness. We show that welfarism as in Saez (2002) is a special case.
Net income equals consumption and is given by ci = yi−Ti, where i = 0, ..., I income groups
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are defined through gross income yi.6 Ti denotes total taxes paid by the individual to finance a
public good G. Each income group has the share hi of the total population. These shares are
endogenous as individuals adjust their labor supply to the tax-transfer system. The social planer
chooses tax liabilities Ti to optimize a weighted sum L based on individual justness functions fi
(described in Subsection 2.2), which may depend on ci or on other factors that do not enter the









hiTi = G, (1)
where µi are the primitive social weights associated with the income level of group i.7 Together
with the Lagrange multiplier λ , they define the explicit weights ei ≡ µiλ , which we focus on in this
study.8 It is important to note that our approach does not require explicit utility functions but nests
the welfarist approach as a special case. Following Saez (2002), we consider the benchmark case
with no income effects, where∑Ii=0 ∂h j/∂ci = 0. Summing the first order conditions (equation (14)








Following Saez (2002), we assume that labor supply adjustment is restricted to intensive changes
to “neighbor” income groups and extensive changes out of the labor force. Thus hi depends only
on differences in after-tax income between “neighbor groups” (ci+1−ci, ci−ci−1) and differences





∂ (ci− ci−1) (3)
6The number of income groups is assumed to be fixed. In the empirical application, we define groups 1, .., I as
quintiles of the gross income distribution. Bargain et al. (2014) show that changing the cut-off points does not affect
the results substantially.
7Positive values of µi imply that the social planner aims at ‘improving’ fi.
8For welfarist applications it is common in the literature to report implicit weights, gi ≡ ei ∂ fi∂ci , which offers the
advantage to remain agnostic about utility functions. In the standard welfarist approach, implicit weights are defined
as the product of the explicit weights and the marginal utility of consumption, gi ≡ ei ∂u(ci∗ ,i
∗)
∂ci
. We calculate relative
social welfare weights ei/e0 as in Blundell et al. (2009). As will be made clear, relative explicit social welfare weights
equal relative implicit weights under the welfarist approach with neither income effects nor preference heterogeneity.
Thus, social weights of all approaches are comparable.
9In the welfarist approach, this normalization reduces to the corresponding equation in Saez (2002): ∑Ii=0 higi = 1.
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∂ (ci− c0) . (4)
The main result is that the optimal tax formula for group i expressed in terms of the participa-
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.
Multiplying equation (5) with ζihidT clarifies the intuition of the optimal tax formula. Con-
sider an increase of dT in all Tj for income groups j = i, i+ 1, ...I. The left hand side shows the
negative effect on tax revenue due to individuals switching from job i to i−1.10 At the optimum,
this must equal the mechanical tax gains, which are valued at ∑Ij=i
(
1− e j ∂ f j∂c j
)
, minus tax losses
due to individuals moving to group 0, ∑Ij=iη j
Tj−T0
c j−c0 h j, and the effect on the objective function of
individuals moving into different jobs due to the tax increase, captured by the second line of the
equation. The first term in the second line captures the effect of individuals moving from group i
to i−1 and the second term captures the effect of individuals adjusting at the extensive margin.
The main difference between equation (17) and the mixed model in Saez (2002) is the second
line, which does not appear in Saez (2002). While in the welfarist approach, changes due to
behavioral responses drop out due to the envelope theorem, in our approach we consider changes
in the justness function, which may change non-negligibly with a change in behavior. The second
difference is that we replace the implicit weights g j = e j





. The optimal tax
schedule in Saez (2002) depends on elasticities and weights g j, whereas in the generalized model,
they additionally depend on the justness functions f j.
The system of equations defining the optimal tax schedule consists of I equations like (5) and
equation (2). In our application, we use the 2015 German tax system, i.e. we calculate the actual
tax liability Ti of each income group, and solve for e1, ...,eI . Alternatively, one could assume
justness weights and calculate the optimal tax schedule that maximizes equation (1) (as done in
Appendix D).
10Due to the assumption of no income effects and because the differences in net income between groups i, i+1, ...I
are unchanged, groups i+1, i+2, ...I will only adjust at the extensive margin.
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2.2 Operationalization of Justness Concepts
The key advantage of our approach is that the justness function can be defined very generally, thus
allowing us to capture a broader set of concepts of justness than the standard approach. In princi-
ple, the function can depend on individual and aggregate variables. The variables included in the
justness function determine the dimensions along which the social planner considers a redistribu-
tion to be just. These variables do not need to be included in the utility function. For instance,
utility is defined on after-tax income ci and the choice of income group i in the standard welfarist
approach. Our approach allows considering non-welfarist concepts of justness that rely, e.g., on
before-tax income yi.
Our approach nests the welfarist approach with quasilinear preferences.11 This special case is
given if
fi = u(ci, i) = v(i)+b× ci, (6)
where v(i) denotes the disutility of work in income group i and b× ci is the linear utility of
consumption. By introducing a general justness function fi, we may operationalize other moral
judgments that depend directly on variables that do not enter the utility function as in the concept
of minimum sacrifice. We operationalize two forms of minimum sacrifice: Minimum absolute
sacrifice based on the absolute tax liability and relative minimum sacrifice based on the tax liability
relative to the net income.
Sacrifice is defined as the difference in utility derived from net income and the hypothetical
utility derived from gross income, i.e., if there were no taxes:
Sacrifice = u(yi)−u(ci). (7)
We focus on the case of quasi-linear preferences, see equation (6), and assume, without loss
of generality, that b = 1, so the sacrifice simplifies to yi− ci. We formulate a loss function that
captures the penalty to the objective function of the social planner if individuals pay taxes, i.e., if
there is a positive sacrifice. This loss function is the justness function associated with minimum
sacrifice.
11The absence of income effects, i.e. the assumption of quasi-linear preferences, is common in the optimal taxation
literature following Saez (2002). In this case relative explicit welfare weights equal relative implicit welfare weights:
∂ f j
∂c j







In the case of minimum absolute sacrifice the loss that captures deviations of ci from gross
income yi is determined by the parameters γ , α , and δ :12
fi =−(yi− ci)γ if yi > ci,
fi = α(ci− yi)δ if ci > yi, (8)
γ > 1,0≤ α ≤ 1,δ ≤ 1.
The first line gives the penalty of paid taxes. γ > 1 implies that the penalty increases more than
proportionally with the amount of taxes paid. The second line captures the gains if individuals
receive transfers. If δ is smaller than one, the marginal benefits of transfers are decreasing. The
parameter α scales the gains relative to sacrifices. A positive α guarantees Pareto optimality if
weights ei are positive, as it guarantees that fi increases with increases of ci. With positive ei,
the social planner never chooses points on the right hand side of the Laffer curve (which are not
Pareto optimal).13 This justness function respects two properties of minimum sacrifice. First,
losses from negative deviations from zero sacrifice, i.e., from positive tax liabilities, increase more
than proportionally with the size of the deviation. Second, positive deviations, i.e., transfers, of
the same size do not offset these losses.14 In our empirical application, we set γ to two and δ and
α to one. The latter two parameters affect mainly the unemployed, the only group that receives
net transfers in our application and thus has a ‘positive sacrifice’. The aim of this paper is to show
which concepts of justness are in line with declining social weights under a reasonable calibration.
Therefore, investigating how results change in a wide variety of calibrations is not particularly
insightful. However, we have experimented with alternative values for α . Smaller values increase
the social weight of the unemployed and keep the weights of the other groups relative to one
another virtually unchanged.15
Similarly, we also consider minimum relative sacrifice where the function includes deviations
12We leave for future research empirical identification of penalty functions. Note however, that this is only possible
if the social weights are known.
13Starting from a point on the right-hand side of the Laffer curve for group i, improvements in the objective function
of the social planner are possible by decreasing taxes Ti. This would increase fi and increase tax revenues. This would,
in turn, allow reducing taxes for some other group j 6= i. This increase in the objective function of the social planner
would be a Pareto improvement as long as individual utility increases with net income.
14As noted in Weinzierl (2014), this is consistent with loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
15See Appendix F for variations of δ and γ .
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if ci > yi, (9)
γ > 1,0≤ α ≤ 1,δ ≤ 1.
A major advantage of our study is that we have observations of individual just levels of after-
tax income for given gross incomes that are representative for the working population in Germany.
Our framework allows using this information in the optimal tax formulae. We specify the justness
functions similarly to the case of minimum sacrifice and set as reference point the level of just
after-tax income taken from the survey. Thus the absolute formulation of the justness function is
fi =−(cjusti − ci)γ if cjusti > ci,
fi = α(ci− cjusti )δ if ci > cjusti , (10)
γ > 1,0≤ α ≤ 1,δ ≤ 1












if ci > c
just
i , (11)
γ > 1,0≤ α ≤ 1,δ ≤ 1.
The parameters are calibrated as for minimum sacrifice. Note that the resulting absolute
weights from an inverse optimal taxation simulation with different justness functions differ in
magnitude because derivatives of the fi functions differ. To make the comparison of weights be-
tween concepts of justness easier, we therefore calculate relative weights by dividing the obtained
absolute weights ei through the absolute weight of group 0 as in Blundell et al. (2009).
3 Empirical Calibration
3.1 The Data
We use data from the 2015 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), a representative
annual household panel survey. Wagner et al. (2007) provide a detailed description of the data.
9
As the model does not cover spousal labor supply, we restrict the analysis to working-age sin-
gles. We exclude individuals with children, heavily disabled and people who receive Unemploy-
ment Benefit I,16 because their budget constraints and labor supply behavior differ substantially.
Group 0 consists of the unemployed receiving Unemployment Benefit II.17 We exclude the long-
term unemployed with transfer non-take up, as they differ substantially from the standard case and
face a different budget constraint. For the analysis we make use of a question in the SOEP, intro-
duced in the 2015 wave, that asks individuals what monthly income they would consider just. This
question is discussed in more detail in the following subsection.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. N
Monetary variables
Monthly Gross Income 2626.75 1925.41 1119
Monthly Net Income 1766.18 991.86 1119
Just Net Income* 2150.85 1040.89 572
Demographics
Sex (1=men, 2=women) 1.41 0.49 1119
Weekly Hours of Work** 41.66 9.51 990
Age 43.97 10.47 1119
East Germany Dummy 0.27 0.45 1119
Party supported in percent
CDU/CSU (conservatives) 13.2 0.339 1119
SPD (social democrats) 8.9 0.285 1119
Bu¨ndnis 90/Die Gru¨nen (green) 8.7 0.282 1119
DIE LINKE (left) 3.4 0.182 1119
FDP (liberal) 0.3 0.054 1119
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP
*Only individuals who perceive their gross income as just
**Excluding the unemployed
Table 1 shows summary statistics for our sample. Net incomes equal gross incomes and trans-
fers minus income taxes and social security contributions. Only the currently employed are asked
questions about what income they would consider as just.18 Therefore, average just net income is
substantially larger than average actual net income, which includes the unemployed.
16This transfer is targeted to the short-term unemployed and depends on the previous labor income.
17This transfer is targeted at the long-term unemployed and covers the social existence minimum.
18For the working poor, we add actual transfers to stated just net incomes, as these do not include transfers. Transfers
include Unemployment Benefit II, housing benefits and alimonies.
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3.2 Just and Actual Budget Constraints
In the 2015 wave, the SOEP introduced new questions that ask what amount of income respondents
would consider just in their current occupation. In particular, individuals state how high their gross
income and net income would have to be in order to be just. A screenshot of this part of the
questionnaire is provided in Appendix C.
Compared to other approaches to obtain information about individuals’ ideas of justness, the
advantage of the question is that individuals do not need to have a worked out theory of just taxation























Actual Budget Line Group 0−5
Just Budget Line Group 1−5
Figure 1: Just Net and Gross Incomes. Source: Own calculations based on SOEP
The 2015 German tax and transfer system is characterized by relatively generous transfers
for the unemployed and high transfer withdrawal rates of up to 100 percent. Figure 1 shows the
status quo of the German tax and transfer system and the just tax and transfer system based on our
sample. The first segment of the actual budget line is almost horizontal at a net income of about
11
600 Euro. This represents transfer recipients. The slope of the budget line is steeper further to
the right, representing individuals who do not receive transfers, but pay income taxes and social
security contributions.
Gray circles represent the actual net incomes for given gross incomes. Some circles are crossed
by x. This means either that an individual considers his or her actual income just or the actual
income of another person. The 45 degree line marks the points where no taxes are paid. Points
above this line represent actual transfer recipients or those who deem receiving transfers as just.
However, most individuals perceive net incomes to be fair, where taxes have to be paid. It is likely
that status quo bias explains this pattern. Nonetheless, the answers of the respondents reflect actual
perceptions of just incomes. The solid blue and the dashed red lines summarize this information.
The solid blue line depicts the average actual budget constraint for six income groups that we use
in the main analysis. The dashed red line shows the just budget constraint for the same groups. The
just budget line is slightly above the actual budget line. The groups are defined as the unemployed
and quintiles of those with positive gross labor incomes. The budget lines are based on averages for
the groups. The actual budget line is relatively flat for the working poor, implying high withdrawal
rates. The just budget line is defined only for those with positive labor income and lies slightly
above the actual budget line. This reflects the preferences for paying less taxes. The distribution
of net incomes for a given value of gross income is skewed toward the no tax line. Deviations
in this direction can be explained with allowances. The positive skew of just net incomes is due
to more people perceiving substantially higher net incomes as just than less. The incidence of
crossed circles, i.e., persons who perceive their current income as just is higher below and around
the average budget lines.
3.3 Labor Supply Elasticities
Similar to Blundell et al. (2009) and Haan and Wrohlich (2010), we use a random utility discrete
choice labor supply model where each individual can choose between five work hour choices and
unemployment. Each hours-person combination is associated with a gross income and net income
calculated using the microsimulation model STSM. See Jessen et al. (2017); Steiner et al. (2012)
for further details on the STSM and the labor supply model.
To estimate mobility elasticities we first assign each hours-person combination in the data to
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an income group i = 1, .., I.19 Then we predict changes in relative employment shares of income
groups due to changes in relative net incomes ci− ci−1 and ci− c0 and calculate the mobility




Table 2 shows average monthly individual gross incomes (column I) and corresponding average
net incomes (column II) for six income groups. As is apparent from the increase in net incomes
from group 0 to group 1, the marginal transfer withdrawal rate is substantial in the status quo.
Column III shows average net incomes perceived as just. These average just net incomes are
Table 2: Resulting Relative Weights for Different Justness Concepts
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI
Group Gross Net Just Net Share η ζ Welfarist Minimum Sacrifice Subjective Justness
Income Income Income Abs Rel Abs Rel
0 0 625 630* 0.11 - - 1 1 1 1 1
1 1137 910 925 0.19 0.08** 0.08** 0.239 0.0020 1.426 0.0797 0.1675
2 2082 1461 1488 0.17 0.10 0.08 0.364 0.0007 0.8488 0.0674 0.3645
3 2697 1773 1819 0.19 0.09 0.07 0.357 0.0005 0.7300 0.0390 0.3083
4 3472 2200 2242 0.17 0.07 0.06 0.392 0.0003 0.8059 0.0467 0.5722
5 5458 3279 3373 0.18 0.05 0.08 0.368 0.0002 0.9048 0.0196 0.5298
Note: German single households; own calculations based on the SOEP and the STSM.
*Just net income for this group is set as explained in the text.
**Overall elasticity of group one is 0.16.
slightly above average actual net incomes for all groups. As only employed persons respond
to the SOEP question about just net income, just net income is set marginally above the actual
19For instance, a person with an hourly wage of 20 Euro earns a gross income of approximately 860 Euro per month,
if she works 10 hours per week and about 1720 Euro if she works 20 hours. If she works 10 hours, she is assigned
to group I. If she works 20 hours, she is assigned to group II. In contrast, a person with an hourly wage of 50 Euro is
assigned to income group II if she works 10 hours, earning about 2150 Euro per month.
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average transfer income of group 0.20 Column IV shows the population share of each income group
and columns V and VI display the extensive and intensive mobility elasticities, which have been
estimated as described in Subsection 3.3. For group 1, there is only one elasticity, see equations
(3) and (4). The last five columns show relative explicit social weights for the different justness
concepts.
The welfarist approach (column VII) is an application of Saez (2002) as in Blundell et al.
(2009). Group 0 has the highest social weight, the working poor (group 1) have the lowest weight
in line with previous studies described in Appendix A. At the optimum, the welfarist weights show
the costs of redistributing one Euro from individuals in group 0 to individuals in other groups.
For instance, an increase in income for individuals in group 1 would reduce income in group 0 by
only 0.239 Euro because individuals would move from group 0 to group 1, reducing the transfer
burden of the state. Equivalently, the social planner values increasing the income for group 1 by
one Euro 0.239 times as much as increasing the income of group 0 by one Euro. The low weights
for the working poor are related to the high marginal tax rate for individuals moving from group 0
to group 1.21 Relative weights of the upper four income groups are close to each other, in line with
previous findings for Germany by Bargain et al. (2014).
Table D.1 in Appendix D shows the optimal welfarist tax schedule with weights decreasing
with income. The resulting optimal tax schedule implies a substantially lower marginal transfer
withdrawal rate for the working poor than in the status quo and higher net incomes for groups 1,
2, and 3. This underlines our finding that decreasing welfarist weights would imply lower transfer
withdrawal rates.
Column VIII of Table 2 displays optimal weights for the minimum absolute sacrifice approach.
These weights show how much it costs in terms of sacrifice of group 0 to reduce the sacrifice
for members of a particular group as defined in equation (8). We focus the interpretation on the
working groups as the unemployed are net recipients of transfers and thus ‘pay a positive sacrifice’,
see Section 2.2. The weight of this group depends strongly on the choice of parameters, especially
α , but this does not change the ranking of the working groups. A comparison of the weights of
20We experimented with different values for this number. While changing the just net income of group 0 has a
substantial impact on this group’s subjective social justness weights relative to other groups, the weights of other
groups relative to one another remain virtually the same.
21Ceteris paribus, higher elasticities and higher marginal tax rates imply a position further to the right of the Laffer
curve and thus lower social weights.
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tax-paying groups shows the highest weight for the working poor, 0.002,22 and decreasing weights
with income. The social planner is indifferent between imposing a slightly higher sacrifice on the
working poor and imposing four times this additional sacrifice on the middle class (group 3). As
the sacrifice increases quadratically with taxes paid, the marginal sacrifice for the working poor is
relatively small. Consider the benchmark case with fixed incomes and the same marginal sacrifice
for all groups. In this case, all weights would be the same. This is the notion of equal marginal
sacrifice. In comparison, in our analysis the marginal sacrifice is lower for the working poor.
Therefore, weights are higher for this group.23 A similar reasoning applies to the other groups,
which results in declining social weights. Consequently, the minimum absolute sacrifice principle
is in line with the 2015 German tax and transfer system.
Column IX shows results for the minimum relative sacrifice principle. Again, the working
poor have the highest weight of the groups with a positive tax burden. However, in contrast to the
absolute sacrifice principle, weights are not decreasing with income but U-shaped. Top income
earners have relatively high weights according to the relative sacrifice principle, because the tax
paid is divided through a high consumption level. Thus a small increase in taxes would not increase
the relative sacrifice of this group by much. In fact, the middle class (group 3) has the lowest weight
according to this principle as one would have to redistribute less to members of this group to reduce
their sacrifice. Thus, the 2015 German tax and transfer system does not imply decreasing social
weights under the minimum relative sacrifice principle.
Columns X and XI show social weights according to the absolute and relative subjective just-
ness principles respectively. The subjective justness principle implies penalties for the deviation of
net incomes from perceived just net incomes. As discussed above, there is no information on per-
ceived just net incomes of the unemployed, so we focus on the interpretation of the social weights
of working groups. For the absolute justness principle, the working poor have the highest social
weights of the working population because their average net income deviates from just net income
by only 15 Euros. Social weights are decreasing except for group 4, as individuals in this group
would consider a net income of only 42 Euros more than their current income just. When consider-
ing relative deviations from just net income, group 4 has the highest social weights of all working
22Again, note that the absolute value of this weight depends on the calibration of α , which determines the weight
of group 0. Therefore, the focus is on the relative difference between working groups.
23As the welfarist weights indicate, the deadweight loss of increasing taxes for group 1 is very high. If it was lower,
this group’s minimum sacrifice weight would be even higher.
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groups since the deviation from just income is smaller relative to the high consumption level of
group 4.
Only the minimum absolute sacrifice principle is in line with decreasing social weights. For
absolute subjective justness, weights are declining except for group 4. The working poor have the
lowest weight of all working groups in the welfarist and the relative subjective justness approach,24
while they have the highest weight of all working groups in the absolute subjective justness ap-
proach.
To sum up, we find that the minimum absolute sacrifice principle is in accordance with de-
clining social weights in the status quo. Thus, the minimization of absolute sacrifice is a good
description of the aims of the German society regarding the tax and transfer system.
4.2 Results for Subsamples
To explore whether the 2015 tax transfer schedule was designed according to a particular concept
of justness with focus on a specific group in mind, we split the sample into different groups. These
groups differ substantially regarding the income distribution and elasticities, which might lead to
different social weights. Moreover, perceived justness of taxation in these groups might differ
systematically.
First, the sample is split into females and males. We find that women have a more elastic labor
supply than men and lower incomes. In light of the discussions regarding the gender wage gap,
subjective justness could differ systematically between women and men as well. Then, we present
our results for East Germans and West Germans, respectively. These two groups lived under
different political systems for more than a generation. We show that West Germans have higher
incomes, less unemployment, but lower extensive elasticities than East Germans. Additionally, the
tax schedule might be more in line with preferences of supporters of particular political parties.
To this end we exploit the rich collection of household characteristics in the SOEP, in particular,
which political party, if any, individuals support.
4.2.1 Results for Men and Women
In Table 3 we report results for the subsample of women without children, which we compare,
in the following, with the results for the main sample and, later, to men. As expected, gross and
24The explanation is that the costs of decreasing the relative sacrifice for the working poor are low because of the
relatively small denominator of f1 and the fact that redistribution to this group is cost-effective.
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net incomes in all income groups are lower and labor supply elasticities are slightly higher. For
the welfarist case, the working groups have smaller weights relative to the unemployed than in the
main sample. As before, we find that the working poor have the lowest weight. The finding that
social weights for the minimum absolute sacrifice concept are decreasing with income is robust
for this subsample. The working poor have higher weights than in the main sample as they pay
considerably less taxes. As before, in the relative sacrifice case, the working poor have the highest
weights and top income earners have the second highest weights.
For the absolute subjective justness concept, weights are decreasing except for group 2. The
working poor have a high weight because for women this group’s actual income is very close to
its just net income. For relative justness, the working poor have the highest weight of the working
groups and the three highest income groups have similar weights. Again, group 2 is the odd one
out with a very low weight.
Table 3: Resulting Relative Weights for Different Justness Concepts for Women without Children
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI
Group Gross Net Just Net Share η ζ Welfarist Minimum Sacrifice Subjective Justness
Income Income Income Abs Rel Abs Rel
0 0 615 620* 0.05 - - 1. 1 1 1 1
1 976 863 865 0.19 0.09** 0.09** 0.126 0.0043 3.8757 0.3059 0.6062
2 1903 1271 1352 0.20 0.12 0.10 0.143 0.0006 0.7603 0.0090 0.0362
3 2548 1715 1747 0.19 0.10 0.10 0.200 0.0006 1.2620 0.0311 0.2395
4 3342 2083 2122 0.23 0.07 0.10 0.174 0.0003 0.9403 0.0222 0.2522
5 4948 3122 3226 0.15 0.06 0.12 0.182 0.0002 1.5273 0.0088 0.2206
Note: German single households; own calculations based on the SOEP and the STSM.
*Just net income for this group is set as explained in the text.
**Overall elasticity of group one is 0.18.
Table 4 shows results for the subsample of men. Incomes are higher and elasticities are lower
than for women. In the welfarist case, weights of working groups are higher than for women. This
is caused by lower elasticities, which lead to men being further on the left of the Laffer curve.
Nevertheless, the working poor again have the lowest weight. The finding that weights in the
absolute sacrifice case decrease with income holds for men as well. The weight of the working
poor is lower for men than for women because the male group 1 pay substantially more taxes than
their female counterparts. Again, in the relative minimum sacrifice case, the working poor have
the highest weight and the middle class has the lowest weight of working groups. For the absolute
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subjective justness concept, weights are decreasing apart from group 2. For relative subjective
justness, the working poor have the smallest weight.
Table 4: Resulting Relative Weights for Different Justness Concepts for Men without Children
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI
Group Gross Net Just Net Share η ζ Welfarist Minimum Sacrifice Subjective Justness
Income Income Income Abs Rel Abs Rel
0 0 627 632* 0.15 - - 1 1 1 1 1
1 1265 971 997 0.17 0.05** 0.05** 0.438 0.0015 0.7015 0.0846 0.1992
2 2228 1547 1565 0.18 0.08 0.04 0.513 0.0006 0.4911 0.1426 0.8650
3 2875 1889 1944 0.16 0.07 0.04 0.522 0.0004 0.4461 0.0477 0.4240
4 3622 2316 2381 0.17 0.06 0.04 0.551 0.0003 0.4873 0.0426 0.5698
5 6124 3561 3652 0.16 0.05 0.06 0.509 0.0002 0.4768 0.0281 0.8907
Note: German single households; own calculations based on the SOEP and the STSM.
*Just net income for this group is set as explained in the text.
**Overall elasticity of group one is 0.1.
4.2.2 Results for East and West Germany
Gross, net, and net just incomes are higher across all groups in West Germany (see Table 6) com-
pared to East Germany (see Table 5). In contrast to the main sample and the previously analyzed
subsamples, in the sample of East Germans the working poor are net transfer recipients and the
marginal withdrawal rate when moving from group 1 to group 2 is still substantial.
The welfarist weights show highest social weights for the unemployed and lowest for the work-
ing poor (group 1 in the West, groups 1 and 2 in the East). An increase in income for individuals
in group 1 by one Euro would reduce income in group 0 by only 0.21 Euro in West Germany and
by about 0.34 in East Germany. The relative weights of the four (three for East Germany) higher
income groups are very similar and higher than the weights for the working poor.
As in our main findings, optimal weights under minimum absolute sacrifice are decreasing
in both samples, though the weight of group 1 is closer to the weight of group 0 than group 2
for East Germany as group 1 are net transfer recipients and thus enjoy a ‘positive tax sacrifice’.
Regarding groups with a positive tax burden, the weights imply that the social planner is roughly
indifferent between imposing a slightly higher sacrifice on the working poor (group 1 in West
Germany, group 2 in East Germany) and imposing twice this additional sacrifice on group 2 in the
case of West Germany and group 3 in the case of East Germany. This shows that the minimum
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absolute sacrifice principle is in line with the 2015 German tax and transfer system for East and
West Germans.
Results for the minimum relative sacrifice principle show that the working poor have the high-
est weight of the groups with a positive tax burden in East Germany, but not in West Germany,
where weights for the top income group are highest. The difference arises because top income
earners in West Germany earn considerably more than their East German counterparts. As ex-
plained in Section 4.1, this implies higher weights for this justness concept because the denomina-
tor of the sacrifice is higher. In both samples the middle class (group 3 in the West, group 4 in the
East) has lowest weights. Thus, the German tax and transfer system does not result in decreasing
social weights under the minimum relative sacrifice principle.
Table 5: Resulting Relative Weights for Different Justness Concepts for East Germany
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI
Group Gross Net Just Net Share η ζ Welfarist Minimum Sacrifice Subjective Justness
Income Income Income Abs Rel Abs Rel
0 0 591 596* 0.18 - - 1 1 1 1 1
1 774 837 851 0.17 0.10** 0.10** 0.339 0.9957 1.0308 0.1211 0.2408
2 1581 1192 1222 0.18 0.16 0.08 0.342 0.0011 1.0580 0.0573 0.2294
3 2200 1574 1594 0.17 0.13 0.08 0.424 0.0007 0.9845 0.1059 0.7481
4 2808 1875 1920 0.14 0.11 0.07 0.430 0.0005 0.8241 0.0482 0.4772
5 4039 2607 2625 0.16 0.09 0.08 0.428 0.0003 0.9393 0.1188 2.3145
Note: German single households; own calculations based on the SOEP and the STSM.
*Just net income for this group is set as explained in the text.
**Overall elasticity of group one is 0.2.
Table 6: Resulting Relative Weights for Different Justness Concepts for West Germany
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI
Group Gross Net Just Net Share η ζ Welfarist Minimum Sacrifice Subjective Justness
Income Income Income Abs Rel Abs Rel
0 0 653 658* 0.08 - - 1 1 1 1 1
1 1408 1004 1030 0.21 0.07** 0.07** 0.210 0.0010 0.7161 0.0405 0.094
2 2324 1585 1616 0.16 0.09 0.08 0.309 0.0005 0.7465 0.0499 0.2905
3 2907 1898 1946 0.19 0.08 0.08 0.300 0.0004 0.6963 0.0314 0.2608
4 3699 2322 2378 0.19 0.06 0.06 0.323 0.0003 0.7449 0.0289 0.3593
5 6010 3516 3632 0.17 0.05 0.08 0.298 0.0002 0.7991 0.0129 0.3652
Note: German single households; own calculations based on the SOEP and the STSM.
*Just net income for this group is set as explained in the text.
**Overall elasticity of group one is 0.14.
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The last two columns report social weights under the absolute and relative subjective justness
principles, respectively. When considering the absolute justness principle, the working poor in
group 1 in the East have the highest social weights of the working population because their aver-
age net income deviates from just net income by only 14 Euros. While the weights jump between
groups in the East German sample, for West Germans social weights implied by absolute subjec-
tive justness decrease starting from group 2. The relative deviations from just net income imply
increasing weights in West Germany starting from group 3.
4.2.3 Results for Supporters of Political Parties
We show results for subjective justness for three sets of political party supporters. This is interest-
ing because subjective just incomes might differ substantially between supporters of different par-
ties. This allows us to analyze if the tax transfer schedule is in line with the preferences of a specific
coalition. Unfortunately, the number of observations is too low to allow a party-specific analysis,
as most respondents do not identify themselves as supporters of a particular party. We investi-
gate three groups. First, supporters of the grand coalition of the conservative Christian Democratic
Union of Germany (CDU) and Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU) and the Social-Democratic
Party (SPD). This grand coalition was in power when the survey was conducted in 2015. At any
point of time since World War II at least one of these parties has been in power in West Germany.
Additionally, we look at two passionately debated possible future coalitions: (1) a left-wing coali-
tion including the SPD, the Green party and the socialist Left party; and (2) a center-right coalition
including the CDU/CSU, the Greens, and the classical liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP).
Table 7 shows results for supporters of the CDU/CSU and SPD coalition, in power in spring
2017. The expectation for this group is that party supporters are relatively content with the status
quo. Compared to the main sample, incomes are higher in all groups. As expected, just incomes
are close to actual incomes. Strikingly, the pattern for the absolute justness weights is the same as
in the main sample. Weights are decreasing, except for group 4. The pattern for relative justness
is very similar to the main sample as well: The highest income earning groups have the highest
weights.
Table 8 shows results for supporters of center left parties. One would expect that high income
supporters of these parties are content with paying relatively high taxes and that lower income
earners would prefer more redistribution. The income distribution of this subsample is similar to
that of supporters of the grand coalition. For both subjective justness concepts, the highest income
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group has the highest weight because this group would consider paying only 15 Euros less taxes as
just. In contrast, in the main sample, the difference between actual and just net income for group
five is about 100 Euros. However, in the left-wing sample, group 4 would perceive paying about
90 Euros less taxes as just and consequently has relatively low social weights.
The working poor have low weights as well even though they would consider paying only 15
Euros less taxes as fair. This is because the dead weight loss of redistribution to the working poor
is low while this figure is high for higher income groups as indicated by the low welfarist weight
for the working poor (not reported for this subsample).
Table 7: Resulting Relative Weights for Subjective Justness Concepts for
SPD/CDU/CSU supporters
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Group Gross Net Just Net Share η ζ Subjective Justness
Income Income Income Abs Rel
0 0 689 694* 0.09 - - 1 1
1 1298 924 929 0.19 0.07** 0.07** 0.1201 0.2164
2 2317 1641 1660 0.19 0.10 0.08 0.0730 0.4121
3 2946 1910 1944 0.16 0.09 0.08 0.0373 0.2834
4 3641 2288 2314 0.21 0.07 0.06 0.0538 0.5911
5 6272 3553 3604 0.15 0.05 0.08 0.0255 0.6723
Note: German single households; own calculations based on the SOEP and the STSM.
*Just net income for this group is set as explained in the text.
**Overall elasticity of group one is 0.14.
Table 8: Resulting Relative Weights for Subjective Justness Concepts for
SPD/Left/Green supporters
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Group Gross Net Just Net Share η ζ Subjective Justness
Income Income Income Abs Rel
0 0 790 795* 0.10 - - 1 1
1 1256 954 969 0.18 0.07** 0.07** 0.0106 0.0153
2 2354 1618 1634 0.18 0.10 0.08 0.0755 0.3154
3 3075 1978 2003 0.18 0.08 0.09 0.0472 0.2939
4 3710 2331 2423 0.18 0.07 0.07 0.0142 0.1200
5 5598 3338 3353 0.18 0.05 0.08 0.0818 1.4635
Note: German single households; own calculations based on the SOEP and the STSM.
*Just net income for this group is set as explained in the text.
**Overall elasticity of group one is 0.14.
Table 9 reports results for supporters of CDU/CSU, the Green Party and the FDP. As expected,
incomes in all groups are higher than in the left-wing sample. This difference is between 151
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(group 4) and 1186 Euros (group 5). Compared to the left-wing sample, the expectation is that
the working poor will not demand substantially more redistribution. Indeed, the absolute justness
social weights for this group are the highest among the working groups. For relative justness,
groups 3 to 5 have the highest weights as they are relatively content with their net income.
Table 9: Resulting Relative Weights for Subjective Justness Concepts for
CDU/CSU/FDP/Green supporters
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Group Gross Net Just Net Share η ζ Subjective Justness
Income Income Income Abs Rel
0 0 696 701* 0.04 - - 1 1
1 1423 925 929 0.20 0.07** 0.07** 0.0571 0.1011
2 2541 1697 1742 0.20 0.10 0.09 0.0147 0.0858
3 3284 2147 2162 0.19 0.08 0.09 0.0481 0.4578
4 3861 2352 2389 0.19 0.06 0.06 0.0186 0.2105
5 6784 3812 3843 0.18 0.04 0.09 0.0213 0.6375
Note: German single households; own calculations based on the SOEP and the STSM.
*Just net income for this group is set as explained in the text.
**Overall elasticity of group one is 0.14.
The analysis by party supporters shows that social weights for absolute justness are roughly de-
creasing for supporters of the grand coalition, thus corroborating our main findings. Consequently,
the results for absolute subjective justness in the main sample seem to be driven mainly by sup-
porters of the grand coalition and independents (see Appendix E). Their preferences for the tax
transfer schedule seem to be roughly in line with the concept of minimum absolute sacrifice, for
which we find decreasing social weights in the main analysis. If the concept of justness that ex-
plains current tax practice and the subjective justness for most people is the concept of minimum
absolute sacrifice, the role of welfarist optimal taxation models is not as important as previously
assumed.
Our results provide the grounds for future research on the formation of preferences for tax
transfer schedules. First, a large scale survey that allows to disentangle single parties or even the
wings of parties could be used to confirm our suggestive evidence. Second, it would be interesting
to investigate whether the tax design forms subjective justness or vice versa. Finally, our analysis
is a first step to implement justness as a principle of tax policy: based on subjective information,
tax schedules may be designed to be not only efficient but also just.
22
4.3 Robustness
In Appendix F, we show the robustness of our results. First, we analyze the robustness of the
obtained social weights for absolute justness to different values of γ and δ (Tables F.1 and F.2).
The result that social weights decline with income is robust to a wide range of calibrations. This
shows that the main result is not driven by the parameter choice. Second, we set the intensive
and extensive elasticities of all groups to 0.1 and show the results for all concepts of justness
(Table F.3). The results are very close to the main results. This shows that slight variations in the
elasticities do not change the results substantially.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we reconcile a puzzling contrast between current tax transfer practice in many coun-
tries and the common approach in the optimal taxation literature. While the literature commonly
assumes that the social planner values an additional unit of income for poor households more
than an additional unit of income for higher income households, commonly observed high transfer
withdrawal rates are only optimal if social weights of the working poor are very small. There-
fore, we compare alternative approaches to welfarism and calculate the implied social weights.
We formulate the problem of a social planner for three distinct concepts of justness: the welfarist
approach, where the social planner maximizes the weighted sum of utility; alternatively, the mini-
mum sacrifice concept where the social planner minimizes the weighted sum of absolute or relative
(tax-)sacrifice; and, thirdly, the approach of subjective justness where the social planner minimizes
absolute or relative deviations from perceived just net income. For the concept of subjective just-
ness, we use a SOEP question introduced in the 2015 wave to obtain information about what
amount of taxes individuals consider as just. Of course, all approaches maintain budget neutrality
and account for labor supply reactions.
Like the existing literature, we find that the 2015 German tax and transfer system implies very
low social weights for the working poor according to the welfarist criterion. The social planner
values increasing the income for the working poor by one Euro 0.65 times as much as increasing
the income of top earners by one Euro. This implies that an additional Euro of consumption for
the working poor is valued less than marginal consumption of top income earners.
In contrast, the current tax-transfer practice can be reconciled as optimal and in line with de-
creasing social weights under the minimum absolute sacrifice criterion, under which the social
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planner minimizes the sacrifice of individuals. In this case, the social planner is indifferent between
imposing a slightly higher sacrifice on the working poor and imposing four times this additional
sacrifice on the middle class.
Moreover, we find that the status quo is roughly in line with decreasing weights and a social
planner minimizing deviations from what taxpayers consider as just. The subgroup analysis by po-
litical parties shows that this result is in line with preferences of supporters of those political parties
that shaped the tax policy under CDU/CSU and SPD in the years 2013 to 2017 in Germany. Our
results suggest that the role of welfarist optimal taxation models is not as important as previously
assumed.
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Appendix
A Review of the Positive Optimal Taxation Literature
In a number of papers, researchers use optimal income taxation frameworks that incorporate labor
supply responses to obtain “tax-benefit revealed social preferences” (Bourguignon and Spadaro
2012), i.e., they calculate the social weights under which the current tax and transfer system is
optimal. Blundell et al. (2009) apply the Saez (2002) framework to single mothers in Germany
and the UK to calculate implied social weights. They find that working mothers with low incomes
have low weights compared to the unemployed and most other income groups. For Germany, social
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weights for working poor single mothers with children under school-age can even become negative,
thus implying a non-paretian social welfare function. Bourguignon and Spadaro (2012) apply
positive optimal taxation to the French redistribution system. They find negative social weights for
the highest income earners and equally for the working poor if participation elasticities are high.
In general, social weights for the working poor are much lower than those for the unemployed or
the middle class. Bargain et al. (2014) calculate social weights for 17 European countries and the
United States. For all analyzed countries, they find the highest social weights for the unemployed
and substantially lower weights for the working poor, i.e., the group with the lowest net income
apart from the unemployed. In Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, the UK, and
Sweden the tax-transfer system implies the lowest social weights for this group. Zoutman et al.
(2016) show that the 2006 tax-transfer system in the Netherlands, as well as reform proposals by
political parties, imply the highest weights for the middle class. Lockwood and Weinzierl (2016)
perform inverse optimal taxation for the US from 1979 to 2010. They find that, if the standard
welfarist model is correct, either perceived elasticities of taxable income or value judgments have
changed considerably over time. This is interpreted as evidence that conventional assumptions of
the benchmark model of optimal taxation should be questioned. Immervoll et al. (2007) find that
expanding redistribution for the working poor would be very cost effective and would virtually
imply no deadweight burden.
B Optimal Tax Formulae in the General Model
Behavioral reactions imply that hi changes in case of a change in Ti. Using the product rule, the



















where λ is the multiplier of the budget constraint. The first order condition with respect to λ is







































With no income effects, ∑Ii=0 ∂h j/∂ci = 0, i.e. increasing the income of all groups by the
same amount has no effect on the choice of groups. Therefore, summing equation (14) over all








The assumption of no income effects implies that only hi−1, hi, hi+1, and h0 change when Ti






























Using the assumption that hi depends only on the difference between the consumption of group
i, consumption of the neighboring groups i− 1, i+ 1, and group 0 and the fact that ∂hi+1∂ (ci+1−ci) =








hi = (Ti−T0) ∂hi∂ (ci− c0) − (Ti+1−Ti)
∂hi+1
∂ (ci+1− ci) +(Ti−Ti−1)
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Using the definition of the elasticities (3) and (4) and that ζi hici−ci−1 =
∂hi
∂ci−ci−1 , we obtain for
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Figure C.1: The Question for Justness. Source: Official SOEP Questionnaire
D Optimal Welfarist Tax Schedule
Table D.1 shows the optimal welfarist tax schedule, where, following Saez (2002), implicit welfare












where the superscript 0 denotes values in the status quo. The simulation was done achieving
budget neutrality and setting net income of group 0 to the status quo, as a deviation from this is not
politically feasible.
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Table D.1: Optimal Welfarist Tax Schedule
Group Gross Net Optimal Relative
Income Income Net Income Weight
0 0 625 625 1
1 1137 910 1269 0.838
2 2082 1461 1640 0.786
3 2697 1773 1848 0.763
4 3472 2200 2060 0.742
5 5458 3279 2842 0.685
Note: German single households; own calculations
based on the SOEP and the STSM.
E Resulting Social Weights for Independents
Table E.1 shows results for individuals who do not support any political party.
Table E.1: Resulting Relative Weights for Subjective Justness Concepts for
Independents
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Group Gross Net Just Net Share η ζ Subjective Justness
Income Income Income Abs Rel
0 0 589 594* 0.12 - - 1 1
1 1050 897 904 0.18 0.08** 0.08** 0.2109 0.4895
2 1948 1379 1429 0.17 0.11 0.07 0.0379 0.2020
3 2551 1694 1730 0.19 0.09 0.07 0.0536 0.4380
4 3325 2111 2176 0.18 0.07 0.07 0.0312 0.3926
5 5270 3199 3329 0.15 0.05 0.09 0.0150 0.4287
Note: German single households; own calculations based on the SOEP and the STSM.
*Just net income for this group is set as explained in the text.
**Overall elasticity of group one is 0.16.
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F Sensitivity checks
Table F.1: Resulting Relative Weights for absolute sub-
jective justness for different values of γ
I II III IV V
Group γ = 1.1 γ = 1.5 γ = 2 γ = 3 γ = 5
0 1 1 1 1 1
1 0.5293 0.0415 0.0020 5.6×10−6 6.3×10−11
2 0.4836 0.0249 0.0007 7.2×10−7 1.1×10−12
3 0.4600 0.0198 0.0005 3.1×10−7 2.1×10−13
4 0.4519 0.0175 0.0003 1.7×10−7 6.2×10−14
5 0.4230 0.0129 0.0002 5.5×10−8 6.7×10−15
Note: German single households; own calculations based on the
SOEP and the STSM.
Table F.2: Resulting Relative Weights for absolute subjective
justness for different values of δ
I II III IV V
Group δ = 0.1 δ = 0.3 δ = 0.5 δ = 0.7 δ = 1
0 1 1 1 1 1
1 4.4×10−6 1.7×10−5 6.7×10−5 0.0004 0.0020
2 1.2×10−6 5.2×10−6 2.2×10−5 8.8×10−5 0.0007
3 7.8×10−7 3.3×10−6 1.4×10−5 5.7×10−5 0.0005
4 5.8×10−7 2.5×10−6 1.0×10−5 4.3×10−5 0.0003
5 3.2×10−7 1.6×10−6 5.7×10−6 2.4×10−5 0.0002
Note: German single households; own calculations based on the SOEP
and the STSM.
Table F.3: Resulting Relative Weights for Different Justness Concepts with elasticities set to 0.1
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI
Group Gross Net Just Net Share η ζ Welfarist Minimum Sacrifice Subjective Justness
Income Income Income Abs Rel Abs Rel
0 0 625 630* 0.11 - - 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.
1 1137 910 925 0.19 0.1** 0.1** 0.169 0.0020 1.5882 0.0558 0.1173
2 2082 1461 1488 0.17 0.1 0.1 0.321 0.0007 0.9157 0.0595 0.3217
3 2697 1773 1819 0.19 0.1 0.1 0.304 0.0004 0.7778 0.0332 0.2627
4 3472 2200 2242 0.17 0.1 0.1 0.321 0.0003 0.8560 0.0382 0.4678
5 5458 3279 3373 0.18 0.1 0.1 0.293 0.0002 0.9411 0.0157 0.4223
Note: German single households; own calculations based on the SOEP and the STSM.
*Just net income for this group is set as explained in the text.
**Overall elasticity of group one is 0.2.
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